Os militares dos EUA não estão organizados para guerra cibernética

The article argues that the United States is preparing for cyber conflict with a military structure that still treats cyberspace as a secondary supporting function. Unlike the other domains of warfare—land, sea, air, and space—there is no military service whose central purpose is to build a quality, expert force for war-fighting in the cyber domain. For more than a decade, Washington has tried to patch this problem instead of fixing it, with Congress granting U.S. Cyber Command new authorities and the Pentagon adjusting organizations, but these reforms have not changed the basic fact that no service sees organizing, training, and equipping forces for cyber as its primary priority. The result is a weaker cyber force that struggles with inconsistent recruiting and retention problems. Cyber talent must be recruited deliberately, trained continuously, and retained through a career model that rewards technical mastery instead of forcing top operators into command or management roles to advance. The article notes that a new report from the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and the Center for Strategic and International Studies shows how to build a Cyber Force with a clearly defined mission, arguing that the threat from China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, and criminal actors is evolving too quickly to justify continuing marginal fixes to the current system.